Biurokracja a wzrost gospodarczy kraju

Aldona Zawojska
Szkoła Główna Gospodarstwa Wiejskiego w Warszawie, Wydział Nauk Ekonomicznych
https://doi.org/10.22630/EIOGZ.2004.52.2
Zawojska, Aldona; ORCID: 0000-0003-3668-0127 (Szkoła Główna Gospodarstwa Wiejskiego w Warszawie, Wydział Nauk Ekonomicznych)
Biurokracja a wzrost gospodarczy kraju
Bureaucracy and Country's Economic Growth
Zeszyty Naukowe SGGW - Ekonomika i Organizacja Gospodarki Żywnościowej, 2004, vol., nr 52, s. 17-32

Abstract

The objective of this paper is to show that the type of state bureaucracy is a key determinant of the country' s economic growth. In its theoretical part, the paper reviews the scientific literature that addresses the impact of the state organisation and quality of governance on economic growth and development: In the second part, the author empirically examines a quantitative relationship between macroeconomic performance in Poland over the 1995-2002 period and such bureaucracy characteristics as employment in public administration, defence and compulsory social security as well as the average remunerations in this section. The findings indicate that the country's economic growth rate and its GDP per capita are directly correlated to the level of employment and wages in public administration sector. According to simple linear regression analysis, both an increase in the number of public bureaucrats and the level of their wages adversely affect the rate of economic growth.

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